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The currently most plausible version of scientific realism is probably “deployment” (or “partial”, or “conservative”) realism, based on various contributions in the recent literature, and worked out as a unitary account in Psillos (1999). According to it we can believe in the at least partial truth of theories, because that is the best (or the only non-miraculous) explanation of their predictive success (especially novel predictive success), and discarded theories which had novel predictive success had nonetheless some true parts, those necessary to derive their novel predictions.
	According to Doppelt (2005, 2007) this account cannot withstand the antirealist objections based on the “pessimistic meta-induction” and Laudan’s historical counterexamples. Moreover it is incomplete, as it purports to explain the predictive success of theories, but overlooks the necessity to explain also their explanatory success. Accordingly, he proposes a new version of realism, presented as the best explanation of both predictive and explanatory success, and committed only to the truth of best current theories, not of the discarded ones.
	Here I argue that (a) Doppelt has not shown that deployment realism as it stands cannot solve the problems raised by the history of science, (b) explaining explanatory success does not add much to explaining novel predictive success, and (c) a realism confined to current theories is implausible, and actually the easiest prey to the pessimistic meta-induction argument.
	

1. Can deployment realism resist the pessimistic induction and meta-modus tollens?





Against Psillos’ claim (1) that only novel predictions warrant belief in the truth of theories Doppelt has three objections. The first is that the confirmation of a theory by data cannot depend on the contingent fact of when those data where discovered, or whether the theory was advanced before or after their discovery. It is more important that there is “a wide range of different kinds of evidence”, or the theory has “a broader explanatory scope” (2005, 1079-1080)
	Now, this is a well known objection used by deductivists to deny the advantage of novelty against predictivists. The latter however have convincingly replied that what is relevant to confirmation is not temporal novelty (when the predicted data were found) but use novelty (whether the those data were used – or more precisely whether they were used essentially​[2]​ – in building the theory). Although temporal novelty implies essential-use novelty, only the latter is required to bar all possible explanations except truth, so only the latter warrants belief in the truth of theories.​[3]​ 
Actually, it can be shown that the requirement of essential-use novelty is equivalent to the consilience of disparate bodies of evidence, i.e. to broad explanatory scope, which rightly Doppelt takes as strongly confirming theories. In fact, saying that datum D (even if used) was inessential in the construction of theory T, is saying that T was already plausible independently of D; i.e., that T was already the best possible explanation of a sufficiently large body of evidences quite different from D; and this, in turn is saying that T is the best possible explanation of a wide range of different phenomena (Alai, 2013). 
So, it is quite safe, for Psillos, to use novelty (understood as essential-use novelty) as a criterion for discriminating the realists’ commitments to the truth of distinct parts of theories.​[4]​
	Doppelt’s second objection to the novelty criterion is that if a scientific realist is a naturalist, as many supporters of the “no miracle” argument, she should treat scientific realism itself as she treats scientific theories. But scientific realism does not make novel predictions. So, coherently, the realist should not require novel predictions from theories (2005, 1080). 
	However, first of all this works only against naturalists, and one can be a scientific realist, even a supporter of the “no miracle” argument, without being naturalist. Secondly, a realist can be a naturalist even without holding that realism is a scientific theory, but just holding that realism can be supported by a typically scientific inferential pattern (inference to the best explanation), based on an empirical fact (the success of science) (Alai, 2012). Even Boyd and Putnam claimed that realism is science-like, not that it is a scientific theory: “philosophy is itself a sort of empirical science” (Boyd 1984, 65; my italics) and “in one way of conceiving it, realism is an empirical theory” (Putnam 1978, 123; my italics). There is no need for a naturalist to overlook the plain fact that scientific realism, unlike scientific theories, is not a description of empirical facts. Hence, it would be pointless to require that it predicts novel empirical facts, and from the fact that it does not, it doesn’t follow that even scientific theories should not. 
	Doppelt’s third and most important objection is that for Psillos (1999, 171) theories should not just predict in the sense of entailing the data, but explain them, in the sense of offering an account which is simple, complete, intuitively plausible, consistent with background beliefs, embedding the entailed datum in a wide picture, etc. (2005, 1080-1081). One reason, Doppelt points out, is that this provides the only defence of realism against the empirical underdetermination argument: thousands false theories may imply the same body of data, but (supposedly) just one can imply it in such virtuous way, and so be candidate for belief (2005, 1083). So, he argues, the success realism should explain is not only predictive success (merely entailing (novel) data), but also explanatory success, i.e., having the theoretical virtues of simplicity, completeness, consilience, broad scope, plausibility, consistency with background knowledge, etc. (2005, 1081). But some of the successful-but-false theories cited by Laudan, and rejected by Psillos because they lacked novel predictions, no doubt possessed the mentioned theoretical virtues (Doppelt mentions Le Sage and Hartley’s contact-action gravitational ether theory, but phlogiston and caloric theories can also be cited, etc.). In this sense, they had explanatory success. Hence, since for realists truth is the best explanation of success, they should be committed to the truth of these theories (2005, 1081; 2007, 107). In other words, here we have an example of false but actually successful theories, which shows that success is not evidence of truth.
	Doppelt’s argument is fallacious, however, for the kind of explanatory success which is explainable only by truth is not just any sum of novel predictions and theoretical virtues, such that in the limiting case it might consist of many theoretical virtues, but no novel predictions: rather, it is the conjunction of novel predictions with theoretical virtues, where the two conjuncts are both necessary! For an ingenious theorist, faced with a body of known data, by reasoning on them may well succeed to build an account which “explains” them, i.e., entails all of them in a simple, complete, plausible, etc., way. The most plausible explanation of this “explanatory success”, however, is the theorist’s ingenuity, not the theory’s truth. Only if the theory so ingeniously conceived turns out to predict data which were not used essentially in its construction, there is no other explanation but that the theory must have caught some structures of reality which are responsible for those novel effects; i.e., that it is (partly) true. Historical novels, after all, are simple, complete, consilient, plausible, etc., but false! So, the realist need not be committed to the truth of any theory, or theoretical component, which yields no novel predictions, theoretically virtuous as it may be.
	Summing up, Doppelt’s criticisms of Psillos’ appeal to the novelty of predictions as a criterion of commitment is off the target.


1.2 Partial truth 

The second defensive move of deployment realism is the divide et impera strategy: when a discarded theory had genuine novel success, it may be recognized that it had some true components, those responsible for those successes. For instance, the existence of caloric and its properties were not necessary to the novel predictions made by the caloric theory, which can be credited instead to different and true assumptions of the theory (Psillos 1999, 108-118). But Doppelt objects that such false components, idle with respect to predictive success, were necessary to the theory’s explanatory success: i.e., they were an essential part of the simple, consilient, plausible, etc. account given by the theory. So, realists should be committed to their truth, or give up the idea that theoretical assumptions essential to success must be true (2005, 1084-1085; 2007, 108).
	But as just noticed, theoretical virtues by themselves are not a relevant success, they become significant only in connection with novel predictions. So, given a theory T1 (e.g., caloric theory, phlogiston theory, etc.) with novel predictions NP and true components TC directly responsible for NP, a false component FC (e.g., the existence of caloric, phlogiston, etc.) would be essential to T1’s success only if it were a necessary component of any other theory predicting NP and at least equally general, complete, simple, plausible etc. But in fact this is just not the case: each of those theories was rejected precisely when scientists realized that there was an alternative theory T2 which dropped FC, but was equally or more simple, plausible, etc., which made all the correct predictions NP and more. So, why shouldn’t we accept as true TC, which is responsible for NP and preserved in T2, while rejecting as false FC, which has been given up by T2? Thus, the “divide and conquer” strategy works quite well even with respect to the more robust notion of explanatory success.4
	

1.3 Referential continuity 

Psillos’ third defensive move against Laudan’s attack (and more generally against the pessimistic meta-induction) is that a suitable causal theory of reference, in the footsteps of Putnam (1975), would show that when a term (e.g. ‘luminifer ether’) is involved in existential claims which are essential to novel predictions, that term can be understood as actually referring to a real entity (e.g., the electromagnetic field) which shares some crucial properties with the entity postulated by the discarded theory, and plays the same causal role. Thus, for instance, ether theorists actually referred to the electromagnetic field, even if attributing it partly wrong properties; so, their existential claims on “ether” were true, after all. 
Doppelt’s objection to this move is very similar to the earlier one: the wrong properties which the ether theorists attributed to what they called “ether” were probably essential to the explanatory success of their theory; i.e., they were required to make their theory general, complete, simple, plausible, etc. How could we then explain its success, while regarding those properties attributions as false? (2005, 1086; 2007, 109).
This objection fails for a reason similar to the earlier one: on the one hand, the fact that ether theory, including those wrong attributions, was coherent, simple, plausible etc., does not require an explanation in terms of truth, but just of the ingenuity of its authors. On the other hand, that such a theory predicted (hence, thanks to its virtues, explained) some novel phenomena calls for an explanation in terms of truth, but those wrong properties play no role in that explanation: in fact, even if originally those predictions were drawn from claims involving those properties, the divide and conquer strategy shows that they could also be derived by weaker and true claims, entailed by the theory, but not involving those wrong properties (see Alai, forthcoming). Moreover, those weaker true claims are precisely those made by the equally or more virtuous theory (ours) which has dropped those wrong attributions. The success of luminifer ether, in other words, is explainable because, and to the extent that, it is like the electromagnetic field.
It has been objected that understanding ‘ether’ as ‘electromagnetic field’ may be overstretched (Worrall 1995). In fact, I don’t think the causal theory of reference as such plays a crucial role in resisting Laudan’s objection and the pessimistic meta-induction: if the ancient ether theorists could come back to learn today’s physics, it is a purely conventional matter whether they should claim that in their time they were actually talking about the electromagnetic field, or should rather grant they believed in an inexistent entity; and it is a merely psychological matter what would they say. There is no fact of the matter on just how much descriptive difference is compatible with referential continuity. Nor this would matter much to deployment realism anyhow: for it is concerned with which and how many true parts are found in theories, and just as claims about real entities can be false, so claims about inexistent entities can be partially true. For instance, there is no truth in ‘ether has weight’, no matter whether by ‘ether’ we mean ether, or if we mean the electromagnetic field.  On the other hand, if ‘ether’ refers to the electromagnetic field, ‘ether oscillates’ is true; but even if ‘ether’ just means ether, so fails to refer to anything, ‘ether oscillates’ is false or void of truth-value, yet it entails the true claim that the transparent, weightless, etc., agent responsible for the transmission of light oscillates.


2. Is success the only explanandum, and is truth a sufficient explanans?

Summing up, none of the above criticisms of Doppelt’s really bites against Psillos’ defence from Laudan’s and Lyon’s objections. But Doppelt has also a criticism against deployment realism as such, with which I substantially agree, even if for partly different reasons; what it points out, however, is not a mistake, but something missing, or perhaps just left implicit in Psillos’ version: the point is that the (partial) truth of theories is not enough to explain all we would like to understand about their success. But this gap can be easily filled: in his proposed reconstruction of realism, in fact, Doppelt himself supplies part of what is missing, and I shall further integrate the global account. 
Realists explain predictive success by claiming the theory is (partially) true. But according to Doppelt they should also explain its explanatory success, i.e., its possess of the abovementioned theoretical virtues: “what realism must explain is why a theory succeeds in producing a simple, unifying, consilient, intuitively plausible, and empirical adequate explanation of phenomena” (2005, 1082; 2007, 102). 
	This formulation of the question is twice objectionable: (1) taken literally, the question is trivial, and so is the answer: the theory succeeds in giving a simple, etc. explanation, because it is simple, etc. What should be asked here is rather: why the theorist succeeded in producing a theory which is simple, etc. (and so constitutes a simple, etc. explanation)? But now it might be pointed out that (2) the answer becomes easy, and does not require truth or other realistic assumptions: the theorist produced a theory that was simple, etc., because she wanted to produce such a theory and was enough ingenious to succeed. The real hard question to ask, which requires the assumption of truth, is how scientists succeed in finding theories which (beside being theoretically virtuous) are predictively successful.
Doppelt has also what he takes as an equivalent formulation of his question, although it is actually a different question: “Is it just a lucky accident that true theories turn out to be simple, consilient, unifying, and plausible, as well as empirically adequate?” (2005, 1082). That is, for the realists the predictively successful theories are true; but they turn out to be also simple etc.; so, the conjunction of theoretical virtues and truth is another fact to be explained.
Doppelt’s solution is to add a new explanans to take care of this new explanandum: the true theory is also the [most?] simple, etc. one, because “nature itself is simple, unified and symmetric, in the way implied by these theories” (2007, 102). In his reconstruction of realism, therefore, a new “metaphysical” (2005, 1082) assumption, the simplicity and order of nature, is added to the usual realist claim that theories are true.
But, upon reflection, this second metaphysical assumption actually adds nothing to what was already implicit in realism: since theories represent nature as simple and orderly, the claim that theories are true already implies that nature is simple and orderly. Moreover, there is a problem with the argument leading to that conclusion: Doppelt asks why true theories turn out to be simple, etc., and empirically adequate. But who says that they are true? the realist, on the basis of her explanatory argument! So, the realist is not allowed to take their truth as a datum to be explained: truth can only appear as the ultimate conclusion of the realist’s argument, i.e., as the explanans of whatever other facts the realist is entitled to take for granted. 
A question realists are entitled to ask is rather: why theories making true predictions are also simple, consilient, etc.? It might be objected that this question needs no answer, for it is just a logical fact about the theory that it has the particular consequences it has, and the simple, etc. structure it has (see White 2003). Nonetheless, there is a real problem here, which is brought up by a more explicit formulation of the realist question: why theorists succeed in producing theories that make true predictions and are simple, consilient, etc.? But as noticed earlier, the explanation for the simplicity, consilience, etc. can well be the theorists’ ingenuity and desire to have theories with such virtues; and the explanation for true but not novel predictions can be the theorists’ ingenuity and desire to accommodate those known phenomena. Only true novel predictions cannot be explained in this way; hence, they are the only basis of the realist explanatory argument, which can be more clearly spelled out as follows:  
Question A: why theorists succeed in producing theories making true novel predictions? 
Answer A: because they produce theories including theoretical assumptions enough close to the truth and enough deep and fruitful to predict further significant phenomena in addition to those used in their construction.
But Answer A as it stands is quite unsatisfactory: why shouldn’t one rather simply answer that theorists are enough lucky to produce theories with unexpected true consequences? (after all, there are much greater chances to find empirically adequate theories than true theories). So Answer A is implausible, unless we can in turn explain it: in this sense Doppelt is right that truth per se is not a sufficient explanans. In order to make Answer A plausible we need to know 
Question B: how do theorists succeed in producing theories including theoretical assumptions enough close to the truth and enough deep and fruitful to predict further significant phenomena in addition to those used in their construction?
The answer (as suggested by Maher 1988 and White 2003) is roughly that theorists succeed in producing such a theories because 
Answer B: theorists 
(B.i) aim at true, deep and fruitful theories, and 
(B.ii) they employ scientific method, which is reliable and heuristically effective, i.e., truth-conducive and favouring novel discoveries.
But if the reliability and heuristic effectiveness of scientific method are not to remain an empty virtus dormitiva, they should be explained and motivated in their turn: i.e., we should explain 
Question C: how can scientific method be so reliable and heuristically effective?
The realist answer, now, is 
Answer C: because it 
(C.i) endeavours to explain observed phenomena by theoretical hypotheses whose consequences go beyond those phenomena and tend to be very general;
(C.ii) respects empirical constraints
(C.iii) assuming that nature is simple, symmetrical, consilient, etc., it reconstructs the unobservable natural systems by analogy, abduction and inductive extrapolation from observable ones;
(C.iv) nature actually is simple, symmetrical, consilient, etc.
(C.v) any background theories employed by theorists or presupposed by their method (see Boyd 1981) are themselves true since derived by sound scientific method.​[5]​





The third distinctive character of Doppelt’s reconstruction of scientific realism (beside the requirement to explain theoretical virtues, and the assumption of the simplicity of nature) is the most striking and questionable: it draws a radical discrimination between (a) superseded false but successful theories and (b) current “most successful and well established” theories (2007, 109), giving up the idea that the former can be partially true, and the latter partially false.
	Schematically, the pessimistic meta-induction goes as follows:
(1)	past successful theories were completely wrong
(2)	there is no radical methodological difference between past and present theories
therefore, by induction 
(3)	current and future successful theories are also completely wrong.
Deployment realism refutes conclusion (3) by rejecting premise (1): it supplies criteria for distinguishing false from (approximately) true parts of discarded theories. Having rejected Psillos’ three defensive moves, Doppelt denies any such distinction is possible, hence he accepts (1): in his view, realism should be committed only to the approximate (but complete) truth of currently most successful and well established theories (henceforth: MSWE theories), and not to the (even partial) truth of past (or present but not MSWE) theories (2007, 109-110). 
	Instead, he believes the pessimistic meta-induction can be blocked by giving up premise (2): current MSWE theories are on a completely different foot from past ones, since (i) they are confirmed by a much greater wealth of phenomena and data, available now but unavailable in earlier times, and (ii) they fulfil much higher standards of explanatory success (i.e., simplicity, plausibility, consilience, etc.): in fact, each successive theory by its own success raises the standards antecedently accepted in its field (2007, 111-112). Therefore,
scientific realism stands or falls on its ability to provide the best explanation of the fact that (1) our most successful current theories uniquely succeed in meeting the highest and most reasonable standards of scientific knowledge in the whole field and (2) superseded or rival theories lack this success. The hypothesis that our best current theories are approximately true, and superseded or rival ones are false, provides one essential component of a compelling realist explanation of this fact (2007, 114. My emphasis).
So, while for deployment realism both past and present theories are (only) partially true (in different measures, of course), for Doppelt current MSWE theories are completely (at least approximately) true, and past and non-MSWE​[6]​ theories are completely false. Doppelt does not explicitly use the qualification ‘completely’, but that he takes superseded theories as completely false is implicit in his rejection of their partial truth; and that he takes current best theories as completely true is shown by the fact that, as we shall see, when it comes to explaining their failures he doesn’t appeal to what otherwise would be the most obvious explanation, viz. their partial falsity. 

3.1 Discriminatory realism cannot explain past predictive success

On the face of it, this radical discrimination between MSWE and non-MSWE theories sounds incredible, in fact it raises a number of problems. First, how is the success of past and non-MSWE theories to be explained, if not by their partial truth? According to Doppelt, we can explain the explanatory and predictive success of a discarded theory like Newtonian physics, and its success in gaining adherents, 
in terms of the stunning unification, simplicity, and empirical adequacy exhibited by the theory, in the context of what was then known about the observed world. In addition, realists can also avail themselves of the assumption that our best current theories are true in explaining the success of Newtonian physics. Our best current theories (relativity physics) show why Newton’s laws work for a more limited set of circumstances than their truth would require (2007, 111-112).
However, the fact that Newton’s theory had all those theoretical and empirical virtues may explain why it was widely accepted, and why the explanation it gave of various phenomena was a prima facie good one (plausible, informative, comprehensive, etc.). But it cannot explain its novel predictions (like, e.g., the existence of Neptune): in principle, an ingenious theorist might produce a beautifully virtuous but completely false theory; but it would be a miracle if that theory also made successful novel predictions. Only partial truth can explain novel predictions, and theoretical virtues can indirectly explain them only in as much as they are indication of partial truth. Moreover, present theories explain the success of discarded ones only to the extent that they show what was true in them: for instance, Newton’s false assumption that (i) mass is inalterable entails the true claim that (ii) at ordinary velocities mass changes are below a noticeable threshold; so, (ii) is a true part of Newton’s theory;​[7]​ moreover, current physics explains Newton’s predictive successes just by showing that (ii) is true and entailed by Newton’s theory; i.e., by showing that the latter was partly true. More precisely, if the successful predictions of past theories were not novel, they can be explained just by purposeful accommodation; but if they are novel, they can only be explained by showing that the theoretical claims essential to their derivation were true.

3.2 Discriminatory realism cannot explain the failures of best current theories

The second problem with Doppelt’s discriminatory realism is how to account for the failures of best current theories. As I mentioned, he makes no use of the prima facie most plausible explanation, i.e. that they are partly false. Instead, first of all he accepts as true only the MSWE theories. This excludes, for instance, Quantum Mechanics, which though predictively successful lacks explanatory success (internal coherence, intuitive plausibility, etc.), and is not well-established, since it is incompatible with another accepted theory, Special Relativity (2007, 100, 103, 109-110). But by the same token, it might be pointed out that Special Relativity is incompatible with Quantum Mechanics, so it is not well-established either. But if a realist can’t be committed to the at least partial truth of the two most paradigmatically successful theories we have, one wonders what she might be committed to. 
Further, supposing there are some MSWE theories, for Doppelt their failures “can be explained as shortfalls that either will be converted to successes with further scientific inquiry or will be found to lie outside the scope of the current theory in question” (2007, 115). But while the former explanation is reasonable, the latter is again puzzling: for, who is to say which and how broad should be a theory’s scope? And delimiting a priori the scope of a theory is not narrowing down its heuristic and unifying power, two of the most salient theoretical virtues? And at any rate, if a theory has false consequences, even if beyond its “scope”, isn’t it therefore at least partially false, contrary to the hypothesis that it is MSWE and Doppelt’s assumption that MSWE theories are completely true?

3.3 Discriminatory realism either assumes that current best theories are completely true, or it implies that they are completely false, and is driven to radical scepticism by the pessimistic meta-induction 

In fact, the most implausible claim of discriminatory realism is that while discarded theories are completely false, current best theories are completely (although only approximately) true, so they are unrevisable, except for minor adjustments leading to better approximation. This flies in the face of the fallibilist intuition that all science is inherently subject to errors; it reminds of Hegel’s paradoxical assumption that the philosophy of his own time (indeed, his own philosophy) was the final completion of a development of the Spirit that coincided with the historical development, with the consequence that historical development itself was to stop at his time; it implies that scientific progress either has now come to its end, or from now on it will proceed only by addition of new knowledge in different fields or on different subjects, without any radical improvement with respect to presently accepted theories and beliefs; in a word, this claim assigns the present time an implausible special and unique status in history.
	The way in which Doppelt supports such a radical discrimination between past and present theories (the vast increase of available data, and radical improvements of standards and methods) reminds of an argument of Michael Devitt’s against the pessimistic meta-induction: although all theories older than, say, 100 years or so are now considered false, we shouldn’t fear that this will be the fate of current theories too, since in the last 100 years scientific method has greatly improved.​[8]​ But the obvious reply is that from, say, 1500 a.D. to 1900 b.C. scientific method had also greatly improved (perhaps more than in the last 100 years, due to the scientific revolution of XVI-XVII centuries and the advances of XIX century), yet it still produced wrong theories. Of course scientific method improves in time, but the question is, will it at some point have improved enough to become infallible? And even more, has this point already been reached? A negative answer to both questions seems inevitable. 
Equally, Doppelt’s very claim that methodological improvement increases its velocity in time (2007, 111) does not suggest that it will stop today, but that it will progress even faster in the future: hence, current theories, if anything, will be shown to be (at least partially) false in an even shorter time. 
	This objection, or one very similar, is considered by Doppelt: even in the past some theories fulfilled the highest standards of their times, but they were superseded with the introduction of even higher standards. So, could not also the current theories, though fulfilling the highest standards of today, be eventually discarded in the face of still higher standards? (2007, 112-113): the pessimistic meta-induction is thus back. Doppelt’s reply is twofold. First, “it is far from clear” that today’s standards can still be improved (2007, 113). This answer, however, is crucially based on shifting the burden of proof, an illicit move in this context: for if anything, all evidence we have is that standards have been raising at all times. Moreover, even granting that standards will no longer raise, the prosecution of research might bring in new evidence, showing that there are radical mistakes in a theory, although it fulfils the highest possible standards. 
	Doppelt’s second reply to the coming back of the pessimistic induction is that 
scientific realism need not be committed to the view that we can determine once and for all time which theories it is reasonable to take as approximately true. Rather, the realism defended here is committed to the view that it is reasonable to infer the approximate truth of whichever theories succeed in satisfying the highest standards of predictive and explanatory success in the relevant scientific discipline as a whole. [Therefore] if and when higher standards and more successful theories appear, this development defeats not scientific realism but rather which theories it is reasonable for the realist to take as approximately true (2007, 114).
But this apparently reasonable partial retreat leads him into self-contradiction: if we grant that even theories fulfilling the highest standards of today can be superseded (which is plausible), by induction it follows that this will be the case for all theories at any future time (which is plausible again). But if with Doppelt one assumes that superseded theories are wholly false, this means that all present and future MSWE theories might be wholly false; and if so, just as Laudan pointed out, there must be some other plausible explanation of the success of MSWE theories. Hence, contrary to Doppelt’s claim (2007, 114, quoted above), his brand of realism does not provide the best explanation of the success of MSWE theories. Moreover, since all past theories fulfilling the highest standards of their time were (supposedly) wholly false, one can inductively argue again to the most pessimistic conclusion, i.e. that there will be no truth in any theory at any time: the realist is K.O.! 
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^1	  My emphases: the reference to successful theories distinguishes this version of the pessimistic induction from the more general one. An original formulation of the pessimistic meta-induction is e.g. Putnam 1978, p. 25.
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^4	  Lyons (2002) objected to Psillos that in a number of historical cases some false claims were essentially involved in successful novel predictions, so novel success is not evidence even for the truth of particular claims. I have replied to these objections in (Alai, forthcoming).  
^5	  The presupposition of earlier theories by the theorist or by her method does not launch an infinite regress, since the earliest, “take-off” theories were introduced without relying on previous theories or on theory-dependent methods (Barnes 2008, 146-155). 
^6	  I.e., those which in the above quotations are called “rival” to the MSWE ones. That for Doppelt also present but non-MSWE theories must be considered wholly false is clear, since what differentiates a present true theory from the wholly false past ones is not its being present rather than past, but the radically stronger grounds which make it MSWE. 
^7	  Musgrave (2006-2007) has nicely shown how approximate truth can be reduced to partial truth in this way.
^8	  E.g. in his talk “Scientific Realism” at the conference Truth and Realism, University of St. Andrews, June 17th - June 20th 2004, or in Devitt 1984, p. 146.
